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ABSTRACT
Drivers are written in C or restricted subsets of C++ on all
production-grade server, desktop, and mobile operating sys-
tems. They account for 66% of the code in Linux, but 39 out of
40 security bugs related to memory safety found in Linux in
2017 are located in drivers. These bugs could have been pre-
vented by using high-level languages for drivers. We present
user space drivers for the Intel ixgbe 10Gbit/s network cards
implemented in Rust, Go, C#, Java, OCaml, Haskell, Swift,
JavaScript, and Python written from scratch in idiomatic
style for the respective languages. We quantify costs and
benefits of using these languages: High-level languages are
safer (fewer bugs, more safety checks), but run-time safety
checks reduce throughput and garbage collection leads to
latency spikes. Out-of-order CPUs mitigate the cost of safety
checks: Our Rust driver executes 63% more instructions per
packet but is only 4% slower than a reference C implemen-
tation. Go’s garbage collector keeps latencies below 100 µs
even under heavy load. Other languages fare worse, but their
unique properties make for an interesting case study.
All implementations are available as free and open source
at https://github.com/ixy-languages/ixy-languages.
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1 INTRODUCTION
C has been the go-to language for writing kernels since its
inception. Device drivers are also mainly written in C, or re-
stricted subsets of C++ providing barely no additional safety
features, simply because they are tightly coupled with the
kernel in all mainstream operating systems. Network device
drivers managed to escape the grasp of the kernel with user
space drivers such as DPDK [40] in the last years. Yet, all
drivers in DPDK are written in C as large parts of them are de-
rived from kernel implementations. DPDK consists of more
than drivers: it is a whole framework for building fast packet
processing apps featuring code from utility functions to com-
plex data structures — and everything is written in C. This
is not an unreasonable choice: C offers all features required
for low-level systems programming and allows fine-grained
control over the hardware to achieve high performance.
But with great power comes great responsibility: writ-
ing safe C code requires experience and skill. It is easy to
make subtle mistakes that introduce bugs or even security
vulnerabilities. Some of these bugs can be prevented by us-
ing a language that enforces certain safety properties of the
program. Our research questions are: Which languages are
suitable for driver development? What are the costs of safety
features? A secondary goal is to simplify driver prototyping
and development by providing the primitives required for
user space drivers in multiple high-level languages.
We implement a user space driver tuned for performance
for the Intel ixgbe family of network controllers (82599ES,
X540, X550, and X552) in 9 different high-level languages
featuring all major programming paradigms, memory man-
agement modes, and compilation techniques. All implemen-
tations are written from scratch in idiomatic style for the
language by experienced programmers in the respective lan-
guage and follow the same basic architecture, allowing for a
performance comparison between the high-level languages
and a reference C implementation. For most languages our
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Language Main paradigm∗ Memory mgmt. Compilation
Rust Imperative Ownership/RAII† Compiled‡
Go Imperative Garbage collection Compiled
C# Object-oriented Garbage collection JIT
Java Object-oriented Garbage collection JIT
OCaml Functional Garbage collection Compiled
Haskell Functional Garbage collection Compiled‡
Swift Protocol-oriented [1] Reference counting Compiled‡
JavaScript Imperative Garbage collection JIT
Python Imperative Garbage collection Interpreted
∗ All selected languages are multi-paradigm
† Resource Acquisition Is Initialization
‡ Using LLVM
Table 1: Languages used by our implementations
driver is the first PCIe driver implementation tuned for per-
formance enabling us to quantify the costs of different lan-
guage safety features in a wide range of high-level languages.
Table 1 lists the core properties of the selected languages.
2 RELATEDWORK
Operating systems and device drivers predate the C program-
ming language (1972 [64]). Operating systems before C were
written in languages on an even lower level: assembly or
ancient versions of ALGOL and Fortran. Even Unix started
out in assembly language in 1969 before it was re-written
in C in 1973 [65]. C is a high-level language compared to
the previous systems: it allowed Unix to become the first
portable operating system running on different architectures
in 1977 [68]. The first operating systems in a language resem-
bling a modern high-level language were the Lisp machines
in the 70s (fueled by an AI hype). They featured operating
systems written in Lisp that were fast due to hardware accel-
eration for high-level language constructs such as garbage
collection. Both the specialized CPUs and operating systems
died in the AI winter in the 80s [12]. Operating systems
development has been mostly stuck with C since then.
Contemporary related work can be split into three cate-
gories: (1) operating systems and unikernels in high-level
languages, (2) packet processing frameworks and user space
drivers, and (3) language wrappers making the former avail-
able to applications in high-level languages. Operating sys-
tems, unikernels, and language wrappers are discussed with
our implementations in the respective languages in Section 4.
Network functions with high performance requirements
moved from the kernel into dedicated user space applications
in the last decade. This move happened in two steps: first,
frameworks like PF_RING DNA (2010) [48], PSIO (2010) [26,
27], netmap (2011) [67], and PFQ (2012) [8] provided a fast-
path to the network driver from user space applications. They
speed up packet IO by providing a kernel module that maps
DMAbuffers into a user space application. These frameworks
are not user space drivers: all of them rely on a driver running
in the kernel. The next step were true user space drivers:
DPDK (open sourced in 2013) and Snabb (2012) move the
entire driver logic into a user space process by mapping PCIe
resources and DMA buffers into a user space library, running
the driver in the same process as the application.
An example for this trend is the Click modular router [38]
that started out as a kernel extension in 1999 and was later
sped up with a netmap interface in 2012 as a demonstration
of netmap itself [67]. Finally, a DPDK backend was added in
2015 to increase performance even further [7]. Similar migra-
tion paths can also be found in other open source projects:
Open vSwitch comes with a kernel module and had plans to
add both netmap and DPDK [57], the DPDK backend was
merged in 2014, the netmap version never left the proof of
concept stage [52]. pfSense [58] experimented with both
netmap and DPDK in 2015 and finally chose DPDK [34]
Applications are moving to user space drivers in the form
of DPDK and are therefore free of restrictions imposed by
the kernel environment. Yet, all drivers in DPDK are still
written in C. Snabb [42] (less popular than DPDK and only 4
drivers vs. DPDK’s 27 drivers) is the only other performance-
optimized user space driver not written in C: It comes with
drivers written in Lua running in LuaJIT [54]. However, it
makes extensive use of the LuaJIT foreign function inter-
face [55] that erodes memory safety checks that are usually
present in Lua. We are not including Snabb in our perfor-
mance comparison because its architecture requires ring
buffers to connect drivers and “apps”, this makes it signifi-
cantly slower than our drivers for the evaluated use case.
Unrelated work: Orthogonal to our proposal is the work
on XDP [32] as it does not replace drivers but adds a faster
interface on top of them. Moreover, eBPF code for XDP is
usually written in a subset of C. P4 [9] also deserves a men-
tion here, it is a high-level language for packet processing
(but not for the driver itself). It primarily targets hardware,
software implementations run on top of existing C drivers.
3 MOTIVATION
Proponents of operating systems written in high-level lan-
guages such as Biscuit (Go) [13], Singularity (Sing#, related
to C#) [29], JavaOS [66], House (Haskell) [25], and Redox
(Rust) [62] tout their safety benefits over traditional imple-
mentations. Of these only Redox is under active development
with the goal of becoming a production system, the others
are research projects and/or abandoned. These systems are
safer, but it is unlikely that the predominant desktop and
server operating systems will be replaced any time soon.
We argue that it is not necessary to replace the entire
operating system at once. It is feasible to start writing user
space drivers in safer languages today, gradually moving
parts of the system to better languages. Drivers are also the
largest attack surface (by lines of code) in modern operating
2
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Figure 1: NIC technology node vs. driver size
systems and they keep growing in complexity as more and
more features are added. There are real-world security issues
in drivers that could have been prevented if theywerewritten
in a high-level language. Moving to user space drivers also
means moving to a microkernel architecture with an IPC
mechanism between drivers and applications. User space
drivers are more isolated from the rest of the system than
kernel drivers and can even run without root privileges if
IOMMU hardware is available [17, 30].
3.1 Growing Complexity of Drivers
66% of the code in Linux 4.19 (current LTS) is driver code
(11.2M lines out of 17M in total), 21% (2.35M lines) of the
driver code is in network drivers. 10 years ago in 2009 Linux
2.6.29 had only 53% of the code in drivers (3.7M out of 6.9M
lines). Going back 10 more years to Linux 2.2.0 in 1999, we
count 54% in drivers (646 k out of 1.2M) with only 13% in
network drivers. One reason for the growing total driver size
is that there are more drivers to support more hardware.
Individual drivers are also increasing in complexity as
hardware complexity is on the rise. Many new hardware
features need support from drivers, increasing complexity
and attack surface even when the number of drivers running
on a given system does not change. Figure 1 shows a linear
correlation (R2 = 0.3613) between NIC technology node and
driver complexity as a log-log scatter plot. The plot considers
all Ethernet drivers in Linux 4.19 and all network drivers in
DPDK that do not rely on further external libraries. We also
omit DPDK drivers for FPGA boards (as these expect the user
to bring their own hardware and driver support), unfinished
drivers (Intel ice), drivers for virtual NICs, and 4 obsolete
Linux drivers for which we could not identify the speed.
The linear relationship implies that driver complexity grows
exponentially as network speed increases exponentially.
3.2 Security Bugs in Operating Systems
Cutler et al. evaluate security bugs leading to arbitrary code
execution in the Linux kernel found in 2017 [13]. They iden-
tify 65 security bugs leading to code execution and find that 8
Year DPDK∗ netmap† Snabb∗ PF_RING† PSIO† PFQ†
2010 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/0
2011 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0
2012 0/1 1/4 0/0 0/4 0/1 0/1
2013 0/0 3/8 0/0 0/0 0/1 0/0
2014 4/11 4/14 0/0 0/4 1/1 1/2
2015 9/15 6/14 1/2 4/7 2/3 1/2
2016 12/22 1/12 0/1 0/1 0/0 1/1
2017 17/23 3/10 0/0 1/2 1/1 1/1
Sum 41/72 19/64 1/3 6/19 5/8 4/7
∗ User space driver
† Kernel driver with dedicated user space API
Table 2: Packet processing frameworks used in
academia, cells are uses/mentions; e.g., 1/3means 3 pa-
pers mention the framework, 1 of them uses it
of them are use-after-free or double-free bugs, 32 are out-of-
bounds accesses, 14 are logic bugs that cannot be prevented
by the programming language, and 11 are bugs where the
effect of the programming language remains unclear [13].
The 40 memory bugs (61% of the 65 bugs) can be mitigated
by using a memory-safe language such as their Go operating
system Biscuit or our implementations. Performing an out-
of-bounds access is still a bug in a memory-safe language,
but it will only crash the program if it remains unhandled;
effectively downgrading a code execution vulnerability to a
denial of service vulnerability. User space drivers can simply
be restarted after a crash, crashing kernel drivers usually
take down the whole system.
We analyze these 40 memory bugs identified by Cutler et
al. further and find that 39 of them are located in 11 different
device drivers (the other bug is in the Bluetooth stack). The
driver with the most bugs in this data set is the Qualcomm
WiFi driver with 13 bugs, i.e., a total of 20% of all code execu-
tion vulnerabilities in the study could have been prevented if
this network driver was written in a memory safe high-level
language. The key result here is that rewriting device drivers
in safer languages achieves 97.5% of the improvement they
gained by rewriting the whole operating system.
3.3 The Rise of DPDK
Section 2 used the open source projects Click, Open vSwitch,
and pfSense as examples to show how network applications
moved from running completely in the kernel to user space
frameworks with a kernel driver (e.g., netmap) to full user
space drivers (e.g., DPDK). This trend towards DPDK is also
present in academia. We run a full-text search for all user
space packet processing frameworks on all publications be-
tween 2010 and 2017 in the ACM conferences SIGCOMM
and ANCS and the USENIX conferences NSDI, OSDI, and
ATC (n = 1615 papers). This yields 113 papers which we
3
ANCS’19, 2019 Paul Emmerich et al.
skimmed to identify whether they merely mention a frame-
work or whether they build their application on top of it or
even present the framework itself. Table 2 shows how DPDK
started to dominate after it was open sourced in 20131.
3.4 Languages Used for DPDK Applications
Applications on top of DPDK are also not restricted to C, yet
most users opt to use C when building a DPDK application.
This is a reasonable choice given that DPDK comes with C
example code and C APIs, but there is no technical reason
preventing programmers from using any other language. In
fact, DPDK applications in Rust, Go, and Lua exist [16, 31, 56].
DPDK’s website showcases 21 projects building on DPDK.
14 (67%) of these are written in C, 5 (24%) in C++, 1 in Lua [16],
and 1 in Go [31]. There are 116 projects using the #dpdk
topic on GitHub, 99 of these are applications using DPDK;
the others are orchestration tools or helper scripts for DPDK
setups. 69 (70%) of these are written in C, 12 in C++, 4 in Rust
(3 related to NetBricks [56], 1 wrapper), 4 in Lua (all related
to MoonGen [16]), 3 in Go (all related to NFF-Go [31]), and
one in Crystal (a wrapper).
Determining whether 67% to 70% of applications being
written in C is unusually high requires a baseline to compare
against. Further up the network stack are web application
frameworks (e.g., nodejs or jetty) that also need to provide
high-speed primitives for applications on the next higher
layer. Of the 43 web platforms evaluated in the TechEmpower
benchmark [71] (the largest benchmark collection featuring
all relevant web platforms) only 3 (7%) are written in C. 17
different languages are used here, the dominant being Java
with 19 (44%) entries. Of course not all platforms measured
here are suitable for applications requiring high performance.
But even out of the 20 fastest benchmarked applications
(“Single query” benchmark) only one is written in C and
3 in C++. Java still dominates with 7 here. Go (3), Rust (2),
and C# (1) are also present in the top 20. This shows that
it is possible to build fast applications on a higher layer in
languages selected here.
3.5 User Study: Mistakes in DPDK
Applications Written in C
We task students with implementing a simplified IPv4 router
in C on top of DPDK for one of our networking classes.
The students are a mix of undergraduate and postgradu-
ate students with prior programming experience, a basic
networking class is a pre-requisite for the class. Students
are provided with a skeleton layer 2 forwarding program
that handles DPDK setup, threading logic, and contains a
dummy routing table. Only packet validation according to
1The paper mentioning DPDK in 2012 is the original netmap paper [67]
referring to DPDK as a commercial offering with similar goals
Total No mistakes Logic error Use-after-free Int overflow
55 12 28 13 14
100% 22% 51% 24% 25%
Table 3: Mistakes made by students when implement-
ing an IPv4 router in C on top of DPDK
RFC 1812 [5], forwarding via a provided dummy routing
table implementation, and handling ARP is required for full
credits. ICMP and fragmentation handling is not required.
We received 55 submissions with at least partially work-
ing code, i.e., code that at least forwards some packets, in
which we identified 3 types of common mistakes summa-
rized in Table 3. Incorrect programs can contain more than
one class of mistake. Logic errors are the most common and
include failing to check EtherTypes, forgetting validations,
and getting checksums wrong, these cannot be prevented by
safer languages. Memory bugs including use-after-free bugs
can be prevented by the language. No out-of-bounds access
was made because the exercise offers no opportunity to do
so: the code only needs to operate on the fixed-size headers
which are smaller than the minimum packet size. All integer
overflow bugs happened due to code trying to decrement
the time-to-live field in place in the packet struct without
first checking if the field was already 0.
Ethical considerations. As handling errors done by humans
requires special care we took all precautions to protect the
privacy of the involved students. The studywas conducted by
the original corrector of the exercise, these results are used
for teaching the class. No student code, answers, or any iden-
tifying information was ever given to anyone not involved in
teaching the class. All submissions are pseudonymized. We
were able to achieve the ethical goals of avoiding correlating
errors with persons.
3.6 Summary
To summarize: (network) drivers are written in C which
leads to preventable bugs in both the drivers (Sec. 3.2) and in
applications on top of them (Sec. 3.5). Historical reasons for
writing them in C no longer apply (Sec. 3.3). Driver complex-
ity is growing (Sec. 3.1), so let’s start using safer languages.
4 IMPLEMENTATIONS
All of our implementations are written from scratch by ex-
perienced programmers in idiomatic style for the respective
language. We target Linux on x86 using the uio subsystem to
map PCIe resources into user space programs. For details on
implementing user space drivers, have a look at our original
publication about the C driver [17].
4.1 Architecture
All of our drivers implement the same basic architecture
as our ixy user space driver [17] which serves as reference
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implementation that our high-level drivers are compared
against. Ixy’s architecture is inspired by DPDK, i.e., it uses
poll mode drivers without interrupts, all APIs are based on
batches of packets, and DMA buffers are managed in cus-
tom memory pools. The memory pool for DMA buffers is
also needed despite automatic memory management: not all
memory is suitable for use as DMA buffers, simply using the
language’s allocator is not possible. See [17] for details on
DMA allocation for user space drivers. This restriction po-
tentially circumvents some of the memory safety properties
of the languages in parts of the driver.
It is a common misconception that user space drivers do
not support interrupts in general. The Linux vfio subsystem
offers full support for interrupts in user space drivers via
an event file descriptor allowing handling interrupts with
normal IO syscalls [41] that are available in high-level lan-
guages. However, interrupts lead to packet loss for packet
rates above 2Mpps on our test systems in a C implementa-
tion. They are useful as power-saving mechanism under low
load and should be supported in a real-world driver, but we
did not implement support for them in most drivers as we
are mainly interested in peak performance.
4.2 Challenges for High-Level Languages
There are three main challenges for user space drivers in
high-level languages compared to kernel drivers in C.
4.2.1 Handling external memory. Two memory areas can-
not be managed by the language itself: Memory-mapped IO
regions are provided by the device and DMA buffers must
be allocated with a custom allocator. Languages need access
to the mmap and mlock syscalls to allocate these memory
areas. We use a small C function in languages where these
syscalls are either not available at all or only supported with
restricted flags.
4.2.2 Unsafe primitives. External memory, i.e., PCIe ad-
dress space and DMA buffers, must be wrapped in language-
specific constructs that enforce bounds checks and allow
access to the backing memory. Many languages come with
dedicated wrapper structs that are constructed from a raw
pointer and a length. For other languages we have to imple-
ment these wrappers ourselves.
In any case, all drivers need to perform inherently unsafe
memory operations that cannot be checked by any language
feature. The goal is to restrict these unsafe operations to as
few places as possible to reduce the amount of code that
needs to be manually audited for memory errors.
4.2.3 Memory access semantics. Memory-mapped IO re-
gions are memory addresses that are not backed by memory,
each access is forwarded to a device and handled there. Sim-
ply telling the language to read or write a memory location
in these regions can cause problems as optimizers make as-
sumptions about the behavior of the memory. For example,
writing a control register and never reading it back looks
like a dead store to the language and the optimizer is free to
remove the access. Repeatedly reading the same register in
a loop while waiting for a value to be changed by the device
looks like an opportunity to hoist the read out of the loop.
C solves this problem with the volatile keyword guaran-
teeing that at least one read or write access is performed. The
high-level language needs to offer control over how these
memory accesses are performed. Atomic accesses and mem-
ory barriers found in concurrency utilities make stronger
guarantees and can be used instead if the language does not
offer volatile semantics. Primitives from concurrency util-
ities can also substitute the access-exactly-once semantics
required for some device drivers.
Readers interested in gory details about memory seman-
tics for device drivers are referred to the Linux kernel docu-
mentation on memory barriers [39]. It is worth noting that
all modern CPU architectures offer a memory model with
cache-coherent DMA simplifying memory handling in dri-
vers. We only test on x86 as proof of concept, but DPDK’s
support for x86, ARM, POWER, and Tilera shows that user
space drivers themselves are possible on a wide range of
modern architectures. Some of our implementations in dy-
namic languages likely rely on the strong memory model
of x86 and might require modifications to work reliably on
architectures with a weaker memory model such as ARM.
4.3 Rust Implementation
Rust is an obvious choice for safe user space drivers: safety
and low-level features are two of its main selling points.
Its ownership-based memory management allows us to use
the native memory management even for our custom DMA
buffers. We allocate a lightweight Rust struct for each packet
that contains metadata and owns the raw memory. This
struct is essentially being used as a smart pointer, i.e., it is
often stack-allocated. This object is in turn either owned by
the memory pool itself, the driver, or the user’s application.
The compiler enforces that the object has exactly one owner
and that only the owner can access the object, this prevents
use-after-free bugs despite using a completely custom allo-
cator. Rust is the only language evaluated here that protects
against use-after-free bugs and data races in memory buffers.
External memory is wrapped in std::slice objects that
enforce bounds checks on each access, leaving only one place
tagged as unsafe that can be the source of memory errors:
we need to pass the correct length when creating the slice.
Volatile memory semantics for accessing device registers are
available in the ptr module.
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Code Unsafe
Driver NIC Speed [Lines] [Lines] % Unsafe
Our Linux implementation 10Gbit/s 961 125 13.0%
Our Redox implementation 10Gbit/s 901 68 7.5%
Redox e1000 1Gbit/s 393 140 35.6%
Redox rtl8168 1Gbit/s 363 144 39.8%
Table 4: Unsafe code in different Rust drivers
4.3.1 IOMMUand interrupt support. Wealso implemented
support for vfio in the Rust driver, all other implementations
only support the simpler uio interface. This interface enables
us to use the IOMMU to isolate the device and run without
root privileges and to use interrupts instead of polling under
low load. Moreover, this interface offers a portable approach
to allocating DMA memory in user space; the other imple-
mentations are specific to x86 and rely on an implementation
detail in Linux (see [17]).
4.3.2 Related work. NetBricks (2016) [56] is a network
function framework that allows users to build and compose
network functions written in Rust. It builds on DPDK, i.e., the
drivers it uses are written in C. They measure a performance
penalty of 2% to 20% for Rust vs. C depending on the network
function being executed.
We also ported our driver to Redox (2015) [62], a real-
world operating system under active development featuring
a microkernel written in Rust with user space drivers. It
features two network drivers for the Intel e1000 NIC fam-
ily (predecessor of the ixgbe family used here) and Realtek
rtl8168 NICs. Table 4 compares how much unsafe code their
drivers use compared to our implementations. Inspecting
the pre-existing Redox drivers shows several places where
unsafe code could be made safe with some more work as
showcased by our Redox port. Line count for our Linux dri-
ver includes all logic to make user space drivers on Linux
work, our Linux version therefore has more unsafe code than
the Redox version which already comes with the necessary
functionality. These line counts also show the relationship
between NIC speed and driver complexity hold true even for
minimal drivers in other systems.
4.4 Go Implementation
Go is a compiled systems programming language maintained
by Google that is often used for distributed systems. Mem-
ory is managed by a garbage collector tuned for low latency.
It achieved pause times in the low millisecond range in
2015 [63] and sub-millisecond pause times since 2016 [4].
External memory is wrapped in slices to provide bounds
checks. Memory barriers and volatile semantics are indirectly
provided by the atomic package which offers primitives with
stronger guarantees than required.
4.4.1 Related work. Biscuit (2018) [13] is a research oper-
ating system written in Go that features a network driver for
the same hardware as we are targeting here. Unlike all other
research operating systems referenced here, they provide an
explicit performance comparison with C. They observe GC
pauses of up to 115 µs in their benchmarks and an overall
performance of 85% to 95% of an equivalent C version. Un-
fortunately it does not offer a feasible way to benchmark
only the driver in isolation for a comparison.
NFF-GO (2017) [31] is a network function framework al-
lowing users to build and compose network functions in Go.
It builds on DPDK, i.e., the drivers it uses are written in C.
Google’s Fuchsia [22] mobile operating system features a
TCP stack written in Go on top of C drivers.
4.5 C# Implementation
C# is a versatile JIT-compiled and garbage-collected language
offering both high-level features and systems programming
features. Several methods for handling external memory are
available, we implemented support for two of them to com-
pare them. Marshal in System.Runtime.InteropServices
offers wrappers and bounds-checked accessors for external
memory. C# also offers a more direct way to work with raw
memory: its unsafe mode enables language features similar
to C, i.e., full support for pointers with no bounds checks
and volatile memory access semantics.
4.5.1 Related work. The Singularity (2004) research op-
erating system [29] is written in Sing#, a dialect of C# with
added contracts and safety features developed for use in
Singularity. It comes with a driver for Intel 8254x PCI NICs
that are architecturally similar to the 82599 NICs used here:
their DMA ring buffers are virtually identical. All memory
accesses in their drivers are facilitated by safe APIs offered
by the Singularity kernel using contracts to ensure that the
driver cannot access memory it is not supposed to access.
4.6 Java Implementation
Java is a JIT-compiled and garbage-collected language similar
to C# (which was heavily inspired by Java). The only stan-
dardized way to access external memory is by calling into C
using JNI, a verbose and slow foreign function interface. We
target OpenJDK 12 which offers a non-standard way to han-
dle external memory via the sun.misc.Unsafe object that
provides functions to read and write memory with volatile
access semantics. We implement and compare both meth-
ods here. Java’s low-level features are inferior compared to
C#, the non-standard Unsafe object is cumbersome to use
compared to C#’s unsafe mode with full pointer support.
Moreover, Java does not support unsigned integer primitives
requiring work-arounds as hardware often uses such types.
4.6.1 Related work. JavaOS (1996) [66] was a commer-
cial operating system targeting embedded systems and thin
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clients written in Java, it was discontinued in 1999. Their de-
vice driver guide [69] contains the source code of a 100Mbit/s
network driver written in Java as an example. The driver
implements an interface for network drivers and calls out
to helper functions and wrapper provided by JavaOS for all
low-level memory operations.
4.7 OCaml Implementation
OCaml is a compiled functional language with garbage col-
lection. We use OCaml Bigarrays backed by external mem-
ory for DMA buffers and PCIe resources, allocation is done
via C helper functions. The Cstruct library [45] from the
MirageOS project [43] allows us to access data in the arrays
in a structured way by parsing definitions similar to C struct
definitions and generating code for the necessary accessor
functions.
4.7.1 Related work. Wealso ported our driver toMirageOS
(2013) [43], a unikernel written in OCaml with the main goal
of improving security. MirageOS is not optimized for per-
formance (e.g., all packets are copied when being passed
between driver and network stack) and no performance eval-
uation is given by its authors (performance regression tests
are being worked on [46]). MirageOS targets Xen, KVM, and
normal Unix processes. The Xen version has a driver-like
interface for Xen netfront (not a PCIe driver, though), the
KVM version builds on the Solo5 unikernel execution en-
vironment [14] that provides a VirtIO driver written in C.
Our port is the first PCIe network driver written in OCaml
in MirageOS, currently targeting mirage-unix as the other
versions lack the necessary PCIe support.
4.8 Haskell Implementation
Haskell is a compiled functional language with garbage col-
lection. All necessary low-level memory access functions are
available via the Foreign package. Memory allocation and
mapping is available via System.Posix.Memory.
4.8.1 Related work. House (2005) [25] is a research op-
erating system written in Haskell focusing on safety and
formal verification using P-Logic [35]. It provides a monadic
interface to memory management, hardware, user-mode pro-
cesses, and low-level device IO. No quantitative performance
evaluation is given.
PFQ [8] is a packet processing framework offering aHaskell
interface and pfq-lang, a specialized domain-specific lan-
guage for packet processing in Haskell. It runs on top of a
kernel driver in C. Despite the focus on Haskell it is mainly
written in C as it relies on C kernel modules: PFQ is 75% C,
10% C++, 7% Haskell by lines of code.
4.9 Swift Implementation
Swift is a compiled language maintained by Apple mainly
targeted at client-side application development. Memory
in Swift is managed via automatic reference counting, i.e.,
the runtime keeps a reference count for each object and
frees the object once it is no longer in use. Despite primar-
ily targeting end-user applications, Swift also offers all fea-
tures necessary to implement drivers. Memory is wrapped
in UnsafeBufferPointers (and related classes) that are con-
structed from an address and a size. Swift only performs
bounds checks in debug mode.
4.9.1 Related work. No other drivers or operating sys-
tems in Swift exist. The lowest level Swift projects that are
available are the Vapor [72] and Kitura [37] frameworks for
server-side Swift.
4.10 JavaScript Implementation
We build on Node.js [47] with the V8 JIT compiler and
garbage collector, a common choice for server-side JavaScript.
We use ArrayBuffers to wrap external memory in a safe
way, these arrays can then be accessed as different integer
types using TypedArrays, circumventing JavaScript’s restric-
tion to floating point numbers. We also use the BigInt type
that is not yet standardized but already available in Node.js.
Memory allocation and physical address translation is han-
dled via a Node.js module in C.
4.10.1 Related work. JavaScript is rarely used for low-
level code, the most OS-like projects are NodeOS [33] and
OS.js [3]. NodeOS uses the Linux kernel with Node.js as user
space. OS.js runs a window manager and applications in
the browser and is backed by a server running Node.js on a
normal OS. Neither of these implements driver-level code in
JavaScript.
4.11 Python Implementation
Python is an interpreted scripting language with garbage
collection. Our implementation uses Cython for handling
memory (77 lines of code), the remainder of the driver is
written in pure Python. Performance is not the primary goal
of this version of our driver, it is the only implementation
presented here that is not explicitly optimized for perfor-
mance. It is meant as a simple prototyping environment for
PCIe drivers and as an educational tool.
Writing drivers in scripting languages allows for quick
turn-around times during development or even an explo-
rative approach to understanding hardware devices in an
interactive shell. We provide primitives for PCIe driver de-
velopment in Python that we hope to be helpful to others as
this is the first PCIe driver in Python to our knowledge.
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Lang. Lines of code1 Lines of C code1 Source size (gzip2)
C [17] 831 831 12.9 kB
Rust 961 0 10.4 kB
Go 1640 0 20.6 kB
C# 1266 34 13.1 kB
Java 2885 188 31.8 kB
OCaml 1177 28 12.3 kB
Haskell 1001 0 9.6 kB
Swift 1506 0 15.9 kB
JavaScript 1004 262 13.0 kB
Python 1242 (Cython) 77 14.2 kB
1 Incl. C code, excluding empty lines and comments, counted with cloc
2 Compression level 6
Table 5: Size of our implementations stripped down to
the core feature set
4.11.1 VirtIO driver. We also implemented a driver for
virtual VirtIO [49] NICs here to make this driver accessible to
users without dedicated hardware. A provided Vagrant [28]
file allows spinning up a test VM to get started with PCIe
driver development in Python in a safe environment.
4.11.2 Related work. Python is a popular [60] choice for
user space USB drivers with the PyUSB library [61]. In con-
trast to our driver, it is mainly a wrapper for a C library.
Python USB drivers are used for devices that either mainly
rely on bulk transfers (handled by the underlying C library)
or that do not require many transfers per second.
5 EVALUATION
Table 5 compares the code size as counted with cloc ignor-
ing empty lines and comments, we also include the code
size after compressing it with gzip to estimate information
entropy as lines of code comparisons between different lan-
guages are not necessarily fair. We stripped features not
present in all drivers (i.e., all (unit-)tests, alternate memory
access implementations, VirtIO support in C and Python,
IOMMU/interrupt support in C and Rust) for this evalua-
tion. We also omit register definitions because several imple-
mentations contain automatically generated lists of > 1000
mostly unused constants for register offsets. All high-level
languages require more lines than C, but the Rust, Haskell,
and OCaml implementations are smaller in size as their for-
matting style leads to many short lines. Java and JavaScript
require more C code due to boilerplate requirements of their
foreign function interfaces.
Table 6 summarizes protections against classes of bugs
available to both our driver implementations and applica-
tions built on top of them. The take-away here is that high-
level languages do not necessarily increase the work-load for
the implementor while gaining safety benefits. Subjectively,
we have even found it easier to write driver code in high-
level languages — even if more lines of code were required
General memory Packet buffers
Lang. OoB1 Use after free OoB1 Use after free Int overflows
C [17] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Rust ✓ ✓ (✓)2 ✓ (✓)5
Go ✓ ✓ (✓)2 (✓)4 ✗
C# ✓ ✓ (✓)2 (✓)4 (✓)5
Java ✓ ✓ (✓)2 (✓)4 ✗
OCaml ✓ ✓ (✓)2 (✓)4 ✗
Haskell ✓ ✓ (✓)2 (✓)4 (✓)6
Swift ✓ ✓ ✗3 (✓)4 ✓
JavaScript ✓ ✓ (✓)2 (✓)4 (✓)6
Python ✓ ✓ (✓)2 (✓)4 (✓)6
1 Out of bounds accesses
2 Bounds enforced by wrapper, constructor in unsafe or C code
3 Bounds only enforced in debug mode
4 Buffers are never free’d/gc’d, only returned to a memory pool
5 Disabled by default
6 Uses floating point or arbitrary precision integers by default
Table 6: Language-level protections against classes of
bugs in our drivers and the C reference code
— after figuring out the necessary low-level details of the
respective language (a one-time effort). We also discovered
memory bugs in the original C implementation while porting
the drivers.
6 PERFORMANCE
The limiting factor for network drivers is the number of
packets per second, not the bandwidth. All tests therefore
use minimum-sized packets (up to 29.76Mpps at 20Gbit/s).
We also benchmark the reference C driver ixy [17] as baseline
performance measurement. The C driver proved to be as fast
as older versions of DPDK but slower than modern versions
of DPDK that offer a heavily vectorized transmit and receive
path in its ixgbe driver [17].
6.1 Test Setup
We run our drivers on a Xeon E3-1230 v2 CPU clocked at
3.3 GHz with two 10Gbit/s Intel X520 NICs. Test traffic is
generated withMoonGen [16]. All drivers configure the NICs
with a queue size of 512 (evaluation of different queue sizes
can be found in [17]) and run a forwarding application that
modifies one byte in the packet headers.
All tests are restricted to a single CPU core even though
most of our implementations feature multi-core support.
We already hit hardware limits with only one core. Multi-
core scaling for network applications can be done at the
hardware level even if the language does not support multi-
threading. The NIC can split up incoming packets by hashing
the flow and deliver them to independent processes. This
enables trivial multi-core scaling independent of language
restrictions, e.g., Snabb [42] uses multiple processes to scale
the single-threaded LuaJIT runtime to multiple cores.
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Figure 2: Forwarding rate of our implementations with different batch sizes
6.2 Effect of Batch Sizes
Processing packets in batches is a core concept of all fast
network drivers [20]. Each received or sent batch requires
synchronization with the network card, larger batches there-
fore improve performance. Too large batch sizes fill up the
CPU’s caches so there are diminishing returns or even re-
duced performance. 32 to 128 packets per batch is the sweet
spot for user space drivers [6, 20, 36].
Figure 2 shows the maximum achievable bidirectional for-
warding performance of our implementations. We also run
the benchmark at a reduced CPU frequency of 1.6 GHz as
the performance of the C and Rust forwarders quickly hit
some hardware bottleneck at 94% line rate at 3.3 GHz. A
few trade-offs for the conflicting goals of writing idiomatic
safe code and achieving a high-performance were evalu-
ated for each language. Haskell and OCaml allocate a new
list/array for each processed batch of packets while all other
languages re-use arrays. Recycling arrays in these functional
languages building on immutable data structures would not
be idiomatic code, this is one of the reasons for their lower
performance.
6.2.1 Rust. Rust achieves 90% to 98% of the baseline C
performance. Our Redox port of the Rust driver only achieves
0.12Mpps due to performance bottlenecks in Redox (high
performance networking is not yet a goal of Redox). This is
still a factor 150 improvement over the pre-existing Redox
drivers due to support for asynchronous packet transmission.
6.2.2 Go. Go also fares well, proving that it is a suitable
candidate for a systems programming language.
6.2.3 C#. The aforementioned utility functions from the
Marshal class to handle memory proved to be too slow to
achieve competitive performance. Rewriting the driver to
use C# unsafe blocks and raw pointers in selected places
improved performance by 40%. Synthetic benchmarks show a
50-60% overhead for the safer alternatives over raw pointers.
6.2.4 Java. Our implementation heavily relies on devir-
tualization, inlining, and dead-code elimination by the opti-
mizer as it features several abstraction layers and indirections
that are typical for idiomatic Java code. We used profiling to
validate that all relevant optimization steps are performed,
almost all CPU time is spent in the transmit and receive
functions showing up as leaf functions despite calling into
an abstraction layer for memory access.
We use OpenJDK 12 with the HotSpot JIT, the Parallel
garbage collector, and the Unsafe object for memory access.
Using JNI for memory access instead is several orders of
magnitude slower. Using OpenJ9 as JIT reduces performance
by 14%. These results are significantly slower than C# and
show that C#’s low-level features are crucial for fast drivers.
One reason is that C# features value types that avoid unnec-
essary heap allocations. We try to avoid object allocations by
recycling packet buffers, but writing allocation-free code in
idiomatic Java is virtually impossible, so there are some allo-
cations. OpenJDK 12 features 7 different garbage collectors
which have an impact on performance as shown in Table 7.
Epsilon is a no-op implementation that never frees memory,
leaking approximately 20 bytes per forwarded packet.
Batch\GC CMS Serial Parallel G1 ZGC Shenandoah Epsilon
4 9.8 10.0 10.0 7.8 9.4 8.5 10.0
32 12.3 12.4 12.3 9.3 11.5 10.8 12.2
256 12.6 12.4 12.3 9.7 11.6 11.2 12.7
Table 7: Performance of different Java garbage collec-
tors in Mpps when forwarding packets at 3.3GHz
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6.2.5 OCaml. Enabling the Flambda [50] optimizations
in OCaml 4.07.0 increases throughput by 9%. An interesting
optimization is representing bit fields as separate 16 bit inte-
gers instead of 32 bit integers if possible: Larger integers are
boxed in the OCaml runtime. This increases performance by
0.7% when applied to the status bits in the DMA descriptors.
Our MirageOS port achieves 3Gbit/s TCP throughput
using iperf and the Mirage TCP stack. The bottleneck is
MirageOS as it lacks support for batching and requires sev-
eral copy operations for each packet.
6.2.6 Haskell. Compiler (GHC 8.4.3) optimizations seem
to do more harm than good in this workload. Increasing
the optimization level in the default GHC backend from O1
to O2 reduces throughput by 11%. The data in the graph is
based on the LLVM backend which is 3.5% faster than the
default backend at O1. Enabling the threaded runtime in GHC
decreases performance by 8% and causes the driver to lose
packets even at loads below 1Mpps due to regular GC pauses
of several milliseconds.
6.2.7 Swift. Swift increments a reference counter for each
object passed into a function and decreases it when leaving
the function. This is done for every single packet as they are
wrapped in Swift-native wrappers for bounds checks. There
is no good way to disable this behavior for the wrapper
objects while maintaining an idiomatic API for applications
using the driver. A total of 76% of the CPU time is spent
incrementing and decrementing reference counters. This is
the only language runtime evaluated here that incurs a large
cost even for objects that are never free’d.
6.2.8 JavaScript. We also compare different Node.js ver-
sions: 10 (V8 6.9, current LTS), 11 (V8 7.0), and 12 (V8 7.5),
older versions are unsupported due to lack of BigInt sup-
port. Node 10 and 11 perform virtually identical, upgrading
to 12 degrades performance by 13% as access to TypedArrays
is slower in this version. Performance optimizations applied
to reach the current level are related to access TypedArrays
(which are faster than plain DataViews) and reducing usage
of BigInts: especially constructing BigInts is slow and most
values required can be represented in the double data type.
6.2.9 Python. Python only achieves 0.14Mpps in the best
case using the default CPython interpreter in version 3.7.
Most time is spent in code related to making C structs avail-
able to higher layers. We are using constructs that are incom-
patible with the JIT compiler PyPy. This is the only imple-
mentation here not optimized for performance, we believe it
is possible to increase throughput by an order of magnitude
by re-cycling struct definitions. Despite this we are content
with the Python implementation as the main goal was not a
high throughput but a simple implementation in a scripting
language for prototyping functionality.
Batch 32, 1.6 GHz Batch 8, 1.6 GHz
Events per packet C Rust C Rust
Cycles 94 100 108 120
Instructions 127 209 139 232
Instr. per cycle 1.35 2.09 1.29 1.93
Branches 18 24 19 27
Branch mispredicts 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.06
Store µops 21.8 37.4 24.4 43.0
Load µops 30.1 77.0 33.4 84.2
Load L1 hits 24.3 75.9 28.8 83.1
Load L2 hits 1.1 0.05 1.2 0.1
Load L3 hits 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.0
Load L3 misses 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3
Table 8: Performance counter readings in events per
packet when forwarding packets
6.3 The Cost of Safety Features in Rust
Rust is our fastest implementation achieving more than 90%
of the performance of C when constrained by available CPU
resources. It is also the only high-level language without
overhead for memory management here, making it an ideal
candidate to investigate overhead further by profiling. There
are only two major differences between the Rust and C im-
plementations:
(1) Rust enforces bounds checks while the C code contains
no bounds checks (arguably idiomatic style for C).
(2) C does not require a wrapper object for DMA buffers,
it stores all necessary metadata directly in front of the
packet data the same memory area as the DMA buffer.
However, the Rust wrapper objects can be stack-allocated
and effectively replace the pointer used by C with a smart
pointer, mitigating the locality penalty. The main perfor-
mance disadvantage is therefore bounds checking.
We use CPU performance counters to profile our for-
warder with two different batch sizes. Table 8 lists the results
in events per forwarded packet. Rust requires 65% (67%) more
instructions to forward a single packet at a batch size of 32
(8). The number of branches executed rises by 33% (42%), the
number of loads even by 150% (180%). However, the Rust
code only requires 6% (11%) more cycles per packet overall
despite doing more work. Synthetic benchmarks can achieve
an even lower overhead of bounds checking [18]. A modern
superscalar out of order processor can effectively hide the
overhead introduced by these safety checks: normal execu-
tion does not trigger bounds check violations, the processor
is therefore able to correctly predict (branch mispredict rate
is at 0.2% - 0.3%) and speculatively execute the correct path.2
2A good example of speculatively executing code in the presence of bounds
checks is the Spectre v1 security vulnerability which exists due to this
performance optimization in CPUs [59]. Note that user space drivers are
not affected by this vulnerability as the control flow does not cross a trust
boundary as everything runs in the same process.
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The Rust code achieves about 2 instructions per cycle vs.
about 1.3 instructions with the C code.
Caches also help with the additional required loads of
bounds information: this workload achieves an L1 cache hit
rate of 98.5% (98.7%). Note that the sum of cache hits and L3
misses is not equal to the number of load µops because some
loads are executed immediately after the store, fetching the
data from the store buffer before it even reaches the cache.
Another safety feature in Rust are integer overflow checks
that catch a common mistake in our user study, see Sec-
tion 3.5. Overflow checks are currently disabled by default in
release mode in Rust and have to be explicitly enabled with
a compile-time flag. Doing so decreases throughput by only
0.8% at batch size 8, no statistically significant deviation was
measurable with larger batch sizes. Profiling shows that 9
additional instructions per packet are executed by the CPU,
8 of them are branches. Total branch mispredictions are unaf-
fected, i.e., the branch check is always predicted correctly by
the CPU. This is another instance of speculative execution
in an out-of-order CPU hiding the cost of safety features.
6.4 Comparison with Other Language
Benchmarks
Table 9 compares our performance results with the Computer
Language Benchmarks Game (CLBG) [24], a popular more
general performance comparison of different languages. We
use the “fastest measurement at the largest workload” data
set from 2019-07-21, summarized as geometric mean [19]
over all benchmarks. Our results are for batch size 32 (realis-
tic value for real-world applications, e.g., DPDK default) at
1.6 GHz CPU speed to enforce a CPU bottleneck.
This shows that especially dynamic and functional lan-
guages pay a performance penalty when being used for low-
level code compared to the more general benchmark results.
Our implementations (except Python) went through several
rounds of optimization based on profiling results and ex-
tensive benchmarks. While there are certainly some missed
opportunities for further minor optimization, we believe to
be close to the optimum achievable performance for drivers
in idiomatic code in these languages. Note that the reference
benchmark is also probably not perfect. Go and C# perform
even better at the low-level task of writing drivers than the
general purpose benchmarks, showing how a language’s
performance characteristics depend on the use case. General-
purpose benchmark results can be misleading when writing
low-level code in high-level languages.
Bench.\Lang. Rust Go C# Java OCaml Haskell Swift JS Py.
Our results 98% 81% 76% 38% 38% 30% 16% 16% 1%
CLBG [24] 117% 34% 73% 52% 80% 65% 64% 28% 4%
Table 9: Performance results normalized to C, i.e., 50%
means it achieves half the speed of C
7 LATENCY
Latency is dominated by time spent in buffers, not by time
spent handling a packet on the CPU. Our drivers forward
packets in hundreds of cycles, i.e., within hundreds of nanosec-
onds. A driver with a lower throughput is therefore not au-
tomatically one with a higher latency while operating below
its load limit. The main factors driving up latency are pauses
due to garbage collection and the batch size. Note that the
batch size parameter is only the maximum batch size, a driver
operating below its limit will process smaller batches. Dri-
vers running closer to their limits will handle larger batches
and incur a larger latency. Our drivers run with ring sizes of
512 by default and configure the NIC to drop packets if the
receive ring is full, a common setting to avoid buffer bloat.
7.1 Test Setup
Choice of language does not affect the average or median
latency significantly: garbage collection pauses and JIT com-
pilation are visible in tail latency. We therefore measure the
latency of all forwarded packets by inserting fiber optic split-
ters on both sides of the device under test. All packets are
mirrored to a server running MoonSniff [2] with hardware
timestamping on a Xeon D embedded NIC (measured preci-
sion 24 ns, captures all packets). The device under test uses an
Intel Xeon E5-2620 v3 at 2.40 GHz and a dual-port Intel X520
NIC. All latencies were measured with a batch size of 32 and
ring size 512 under bidirectional load with constant bit-rate
traffic. The device under test has a maximum buffer capac-
ity of 1,088 packets in this configuration. Different batch
sizes, ring sizes, and NUMA configurations affect latency
in the same way for all programming languages, interested
readers are referred to the original publication about the C
driver [17].
7.2 Tail Latencies
Figure 3 shows latencies of our drivers when forwarding
packets at different rates. The data is plotted as CCDF to
focus on the worst-case latencies. Implementations not able
to cope with the offered load are omitted from the graphs
— their latency is simply a function of the buffer size as the
receive buffers fill up completely. No maximum observed
latency is significantly different from the 99.9999th percentile.
Java and JavaScript lose packets during startup due to JIT
compilation, we therefore exclude the first 5 seconds of the
test runs for these two languages. All other tests shown ran
without packet loss.
7.2.1 Rust and C. Even Rust and C show a skewed latency
distribution with some packets taking 5 times as long as the
median packet. One reason for this is that all our drivers
handle periodic (1Hz) printing of throughput statistics in
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Figure 3: Tail latency of our implementations when
forwarding packets
the main thread. Note that the 99.9999th percentile means
that one in a million packets is affected. Printing statistics
once per second at 1Mpps or more thus affects latency at
this level. A second reason is that it is not possible to isolate a
core completely from the system on Linux. Some very short
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600
100
10−2
10−4
10−6
Latency [µs]
C
C
D
F
CMS Serial Parallel G1
ZGC Shenandoah Epsilon (no-op)
99th percentile
99.99th percentile
99.9999th percentile
Figure 4: Forwarding latency of Java at 1Mpps with
different garbage collectors
local timer interrupts are even present with the isolcpus
kernel option. C outperforms Rust at 20Mpps because Rust
operates close to its limit of ≈24Mpps on this system and
processes larger batches.
7.2.2 Go. Go’s low-latency garbage collector achieves the
lowest pause times of any garbage-collected language here.
Latency suffers at 20Mpps because the driver operates at its
limit on this system here. Cutler et al. measured a maximum
garbage collection pause of 115 µs in their Go operating
system, demonstrating that sub-millisecond pauses with Go
are possible even in larger applications.
7.2.3 C#. C# features several garbage collector modes
tuned for different workloads [44]. The default garbage col-
lector caused a latency of 240 µs at the 99.9999th percentile
at 10Mpps. Switching it to SustainedLowLatency reduces
latency to only 55 µs, this change also reduces the maximum
achievable throughput by 1.2%. All measurements were per-
formed with the SustainedLowLatency garbage collector.
C# also uses a JIT compiler that might introduce additional
pause times. However, the compilation of most functions
happens immediately after startup even if no packets are
forwarded: We implement a poll-mode driver that effectively
warms up the JIT compiler.
7.2.4 Java. Java exhibits packet loss and excessive laten-
cies during the first few seconds of all test runs, this is likely
due to JIT compilation hitting a function only after the traf-
fic flow starts. All latency measurements for Java therefore
exclude the first 5 seconds of the test runs. Figure 3(a) shows
results for the Shenandoah garbage collector which exhib-
ited the lowest latency. We also tried the different settings in
Shenandoah that are recommended for low-latency require-
ments [53]. Neither using a fixed-size heap with pre-touched
pages, nor disabling biased locking made a measurable dif-
ference. Changing the heuristic from the default adaptive
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to static reduces worst-case latency from 338 µs to 323 µs,
setting it to compact increases latency to 800 µs.
Figure 4 compares the latency incurred by the different
available garbage collectors in OpenJDK 12 while forward-
ing 1Mpps. We configured the lowest possible target pause
time of 1ms. Note that the maximum buffer time with this
configuration is ≈1.1ms, i.e., the CMS collector drops pack-
ets at this rate. This could be mitigated by larger rings or
by enabling buffering on the NIC if the ring is full. There
is a clear trade-off between throughput and latency for the
different garbage collectors, cf. Table 7. ZGC hits a sweet
spot between high throughput and low latency. Even Epsilon
(no-op, never frees objects) is also not ideal, indicating that
the garbage collector is not the only cause of latency. This
can be attributed to the JIT and/or the bad data locality as it
fills up the whole address space.
7.2.5 OCaml and Haskell. Both OCaml and Haskell ship
with only a relatively simple garbage collector (compared to
Go, C#, and Java) not optimized for sub-millisecond pause
times. Haskell even drops packets due to garbage collec-
tion pauses when the multi-threaded runtime is enabled, the
single threaded runtime performs reasonably well. Haskell
plans to provide a new low-latency garbage collector later
in 2019 [21].
7.2.6 Swift. It remains unclear why Swift performs worse
than some garbage-collected languages. Its reference count-
ing memory management should distribute the work evenly
and not lead to spikes, but we observe tail latency comparable
to the garbage-collected Haskell driver.
7.2.7 JavaScript. JavaScript loses packets during startup,
indicating that the JIT compiler is to blame, the graph ex-
cludes the first 5 seconds. The latency is still off the chart, the
99.99th percentile is 261 µs, the 99.9999th percentile 353 µs
and the maximum 359 µs.
7.2.8 Python. Python exhibits packet loss even at low
rates and is therefore excluded here, worst-case latencies are
several milliseconds even when running at 0.1Mpps.
8 CONCLUSION
Rewriting the entire operating system in a high-level lan-
guage is a laudable effort but unlikely to disrupt the big
mainstream desktop and server operating systems in the
near future. We propose to start rewriting drivers as user
space drivers in high-level languages instead as they present
the largest attack surface. 39 of the 40 memory safety bugs
in Linux examined here are located in drivers, showing that
most of the security improvements can be gained without
replacing the whole operating system. Network drivers are a
good starting point for this effort: User space network drivers
written in C are already commonplace. Moreover, they are
critical for security: they are exposed to the external world
or serve as a barrier isolating untrusted virtual machines
(e.g., CVE-2018-1059 in DPDK allowed VMs to extract host
memory due to a missing bounds check [15]).
Higher layers of the network stack are also alreadymoving
towards high-level languages (e.g., the TCP stack in Fuch-
sia [22] is written in Go) and towards user space implemen-
tations. The transport protocol QUIC is only available as
user space libraries, e.g., in Chromium [23] or CloudFlare’s
quiche written in Rust [11]. Apple runs a user space TCP
stack on mobile devices [10]. User space stacks also call for
a more modern interface than POSIX sockets: the socket re-
placement TAPS is currently being standardized, it explicitly
targets “modern platforms and programming languages” [70].
This trend simplifies replacing the kernel C drivers with user
space drivers in high-level languages as legacy interfaces are
being deprecated.
Our evaluation shows that Rust is a prime candidate for
safer drivers: its ownership-based management system pre-
vents memory bugs even in custom memory areas not al-
located by the language runtime. The cost of these safety
and security features are only 2% - 10% of throughput on
modern out-of-order CPUs. Rust’s ownership based memory
management provides more safety features than languages
based on garbage collection here and it does so without af-
fecting latency. Linux kernel developers recently discussed
the possibility to accept Rust code in the kernel as an optional
dependency to enable safer code [51].
Go and C# are also a suitable language if the system can
cope with sub-millisecond latency spikes due to garbage
collection. The other languages discussed here can also be
useful if performance is less critical than having a safe and
correct system, for example, Haskell and OCaml are more
suitable for formal verification.
REPRODUCIBLE RESEARCH
We publish all of our source code and test scripts on GitHub
at https://github.com/ixy-languages/ixy-languages. The only
hardware requirement is a network card from the ixgbe fam-
ily which are readily available from several vendors and
often found as on-board NICs.
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